This paper analyzes the e¤ects of state-level personal tax rates on state tax revenue and individual welfare. The policy analysis based on a general equilibrium model suggests that tax revenues would bene…t from higher wage-income, sales or property taxes, while any increase in dividend-income tax would result in a reduction of revenues. It is also shown that individuals would su¤er from an increase in state-level wage-income tax, dividend-tax or sales tax, while they would bene…t from an increase in property taxes. The heterogeneity across states is determined by a TaxIndex, a weighted average of initial taxes at the state level.
Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 had a devastating e¤ect on state …nances in the U.S. when states took in $87 billion less in tax revenue from October 2008 through September 2009 than they collected in the previous 12 months; this corresponds to a decline of 11 percent, the steepest on record, resulted from the impact on tax collections of reduced wages and lowered economic activity (see Johnson et al., 2010) . The requirement that states have balanced budgets has increased the pressure on states to deal with the unprecedented revenue shortfalls in a variety of ways; to recoup lost revenue, states have taken actions such as increasing tax rates. For example, according to the U.S. Census of Governments, the share of tax revenue in overall state revenue has increased from 38% to 42% between 2007 and 2012, on average across states. 1 However, when it comes to the policy details, which type of tax should be modi…ed in each state to improve the state budget? What are the implications for individual welfare and interstate migration? These questions can only be answered by considering the economic behavior of all agents in all states such that the interaction between alternative tax types can be investigated at the state level.
Accordingly, this paper introduces a general equilibrium regional trade model with an analytical solution to investigate the e¤ects of tax changes at the regional level. The model has been designed to consider alternative types of tax (wage-income, dividend-income, property, and sales taxes). As in Roos (2004) , individuals get utility out of consumption goods and housing as well as public goods produced by the local government; the former two are purchased using wage income and dividend income, while the latter is …nanced by the taxes collected from individuals. The consideration of public goods in the individual utility is important, because as shown by Partridge and Rickman (1998), equalization of real wage rates that omits the consumption of regional amenities would not be enough to examine the policies to increase quality of life such as improved schools or recreation- 1 The story is very similar to the slowdown of the U.S. economy in 2001 when many states raised taxes to balance their budgets; see Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) .
2 related public infrastructure. In addition to Roos (2004), we have disutility of supplying labor in the utility function.
In the model, private …rms produce consumption goods that are traded across regions. Although the only factor of production is labor as in Roos (2004) Public good is produced by the local government by using labor only. The amount of the public good produced depends on the taxes collected as in Roos (2004) who considers public goods …nanced by taxes on housing only; this paper deviates by considering taxes collected by other types of tax (wage-income, dividend-income, and sales taxes) as well. Such a strategy is essential for answering one of the main questions in this paper regarding the type of tax that should be modi…ed in each state to improve the state budget.
In equilibrium, the consumption, labor and housing markets clear, while the nontraded public good in each region is shared among individuals of that region. Although individuals migrate in the long-run until individual welfare is equalized across regions, population in each region is …xed in the short-run; these two extreme cases practically cover the overall range for possible degrees of labor mobility across regions, consistent with the evidence (in the existing literature) that original residents bene…t from reduced unemployment due to migrating individuals. 2 The model is shown to explain the state-level data from the U.S. which are also used to estimate the parameters of the model that are necessary for the policy analysis. 3 The corresponding policy 2 See Bartik (1991 Bartik ( ,1994 and Partridge and Rickman (1999) . 3 Such an empirical strategy is consistent with studies such as by McKitrick (1998) who argues that econometric 3 investigation at the state level suggests that increases in wage-income, property or sales taxes would result in an increase in the state tax revenue in any state, while dividend-income taxes are harmful for any state budget. The latter result is consistent with in ‡uential studies such as by Judd (1985) , Chamley (1986) or Atkeson et al. (1999) , together with their followers, who have
shown the optimality of a zero capital-income tax; however, it contradicts the conventional view in the public …nance literature that capital income should be taxed heavily. The main reason behind this dilemma is that the conventional view in the public …nance literature implies that capital income taxes do not distort economic decisions (since the portion of income consumed is …xed); however, in this paper, together with earlier studies by studies such as by Judd (1985) , Chamley (1986) and Atkeson et al. (1999) , dividend-income tax does distort economic decisions.
The distortion in this paper is achieved by dividend-income changes that a¤ect consumption and labor-supply decisions of individuals through the overall pro…tability of production …rms that are imperfectly competitive, where such pro…ts are further shared among individuals.
There is also evidence for heterogeneity across states regarding their elasticity of tax revenue with respect to state-level taxes. The model implies that a T axIndex, which is a weighted average of initial taxes (of wage-income, dividend-income, property, and sales) at the state level, where weights are determined according to the individual preferences given in their utility functions, is an important determinant of this heterogeneity. In particular, states with a lower T axIndex would bene…t more from an increase in their wage-income, property or sales taxes, while the harmful e¤ects of dividend-income taxes would be higher for states with a higher T axIndex.
Although individual welfare is equalized across states in the long-run (consistent with Gyourko and Tracy, 1989; Dalenberg and Partridge, 1997), state-level tax increases can still be harmful for individual welfare in the short-run, except for the increases in property taxes. In particular, the most harmful tax type for individual welfare in the short-run is the state-level wage-income tax followed by sales and dividend-income taxes. There is also evidence for heterogeneity across estimation of general equilibrium models is superior. 4 states regarding the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to state-level taxes in the shortrun. Once again, T axIndex is shown to be the main determinant of this heterogeneity, where individual welfare in states with a higher T axIndex would su¤er more from an increase in statelevel wage-income, dividend-income or sales taxes, but they would bene…t less out of an increase in property taxes in states.
An important state-level policy implication is that property tax is the only tax type of which increase would boost both state tax revenue and short-run individual welfare in any state. This is due to individuals who have to supply more labor due to higher property taxes resulting in lower wages and thus higher levels of production and income at the state level, which means higher state-level tax revenues and abundance of public goods. In contrast, an increase in statelevel wage-income or sales tax would result in higher state tax revenue in the cost of individual welfare. The worst alternative is to increase state-level dividend-income taxes that would result in a reduction in both state tax revenue and individual welfare for any state. The latter is due to individuals consuming less and supplying more labor after the increase in dividend-income taxes that result in higher wages together with lower production/income and thus lower state tax revenue and lower public goods. For any type of tax, these e¤ects are shown to be magni…ed by the T axIndex across states. there is a trade-o¤ between increasing taxes and increasing public goods. This paper has considered such linkages by including public goods in the utility function of individuals that are …nanced by the taxes in their budget constraint.
Regarding individual welfare and interregional migration, Cebula (1979) and Charney (1993) show that many …scal characteristics play important roles; these include tax and expenditure policies of governments that may change income and the subsequent consumption of individuals.
However, most studies are not able to capture the possibility that some individuals are attracted to higher tax burdens if the ensuing government spending is bene…cial to them, while others are repelled by the higher tax burden as described in the subnational redistribution literature; one exception is by Knapp et al. (2001) who …nd that higher state tax liabilities encourage people to stay in their states. This paper contributes by showing that the property tax is the only tax type of which increase would encourage people to stay in the long-run, while increases in other tax types would encourage people to leave. It is implied that the tax structure determined by the tax portfolio is an important factor in each state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the economic environment that is essential for the state-level policy analysis in Section 3. Section 4 concludes by providing policy suggestions/evaluations, while the Online Appendix provides all the technical details of the policy analysis, including the analytical solution and empirical tests of the model.
The Economic Environment
The U.S. economy consisting of …fty states and the District of Columbia (totally 51 regions) is modeled. The static model consists of a …nite number of regions, …nite number of individuals in each region, a private …rm in each region, a local government producing the public good in each 6 region, region-speci…c (wage-income, dividend-income, property, sales) taxes, trade of goods across regions, and migrating individuals.
The modeling strategy that we follow is not arbitrary, and it is partly to capture the economic interaction in the U.S. economy (e.g., interregional trade in consumption goods), partly to investigate dividend-income taxes (e.g., pro…ts through monopolistically-competitive …rms), and partly to obtain an analytical solution that considers migration (e.g., …nite numbers of regions and individuals). The private …rm in each region is perfectly specialized in the production of a good/commodity so that it has a market power to set its price with a markup over its marginal cost where the markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution across private-sector goods.
The local government in each region produces a unique public good until total costs are equalized to total taxes collected in that region. The total amount of the public good in each region is equally shared/consumed among the individuals in that region; the public good is nontradable.
Both private and public sectors in each state have constant returns to scale production technologies that use labor as the only factor of production and are subject to region-speci…c technology levels. Individuals have utilities from …nal goods of the private sector coming from all regions, the public good in their region, and the housing/property that they live at; they have disutility from supplying labor to the local private and public sectors. The regional taxes come into the picture in the budget constraint of the individuals. There is a local labor market in each region where the total labor demand coming from private and public sectors are matched with the labor supply coming from the individuals. The total pro…t of monopolistically-competitive private sector in all regions is equally shared among all individuals in all regions. Because each private …rm (in each region) supplies its traded good to individuals in all regions, there are economic interactions across all regions.
The analysis is made for a typical region r which is specialized in the manufacturing of a unique good r. An individual is denoted by h, and total number of individuals in region r is H r . 7
Individuals
A typical individual h in region r maximizes:
where C C r (h) is a per capita composite index of consumption goods, C L r (h) is per capita housing, C P r (h) is per capita public good in region r, and N r (h) is per capita hours of labor supplied. 4 The composite index of consumption goods in region r is further de…ned as:
is per capita consumption in region r of good i (produced in region i). Besides labor income, each individual also receives (h) as dividend income due to her share of positive pro…ts coming from the private-sector production and nationwide house ownership; (h) independent of the location of residence. In this context, the individual in region r maximizes Equation 2.1 subject to the following budget constraint:
where P C r is the price of the composite-consumption good, t C r is the sales tax rate, P L r is the price of housing, t L r is the tax rate on housing (i.e., property tax), W r is hourly nominal wage, t W r is the wage-income tax rate, and t D r is the dividend-income tax rate in region r.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure yields the following demand function for imports of region r from region i:
is the cost-of-living index in region r. 4 The utility shares add up to one:
The corresponding analysis should be perceived as for the average individual in any state, since we do not have any individual heterogeneity. 5 It follows from the equations above that
The individual maximizes utility by choosing
, and N r (h); the amount of public good is determined by the public sector. Therefore, the optimality condition for the individual is given by:
where taxes play an important role.
Production/Endowment
There are two types of production in this economy: (i) consumption-good production by the private sector, (ii) public-good production by the public sector.
Private-Sector Production
The monopolistically-competitive private-sector production …rm in region r produces good r by using local labor. The production is achieved according to the following constant returns to scale function:
where A C r represents good-and region-speci…c production technology and L C r represents labor. To avoid any double taxation, the production …rm does not pay any taxes (because individuals pay dividend taxes instead).
The cost minimization problem results in the following marginal cost of producing consumption good r (in region r):
which is region speci…c. Market clearing for goods produced in region r is given by:
which implies the following factory-gate price according to pro…t maximization:
where the destination price in region i given by P C i;r is connected to the factory-gate price in region r given by P C r;r according to P C i;r = P C r;r i , where i represents destination-speci…c distribution costs (e.g., retailing costs); gross markups are represented by 1 in this expression. In order to close the model, the total pro…t of the private-sector production in all regions are equally shared among individuals in all regions (as a part of (h)).
Public-Sector Production
The local government in region r collects the following amount of tax revenue T r :
where H r represents the population. The tax revenue is further used to produce the unique public good by using labor according to the following function in region r:
where A P r represents good-and region-speci…c public-good-production technology and L P r is labor.
The cost minimization problem results in the following marginal cost of public good:
The local government produces the public good as long as it can cover the total costs; therefore, the total costs of local public good is equal to the tax revenue according to:
Housing
Each region r is endowed with an available housing of Y L r consumed by the individuals in that region:
where C L r (h) is per capita housing in region r (as above). In order to close the model, the housing revenue coming from all regions is equally shared among individuals in all regions (as a part of (h)).
Analytical Solution
In equilibrium, regional labor markets clear, and 
Empirical Power of the Model
The implications of the model are tested for (i) the relation between total revenue and total costs of the private sector; (ii) the ratio of population across U. We distinguish between the short-run and long-run e¤ects of tax rate changes, where short-run is de…ned as the case in which individual migration is not allowed across states, while long-run is de…ned as the case in which individuals can migrate across states in order to equalize individual utility across states.
It is important to emphasize that some states may have a initial state-level tax rate of zero for some tax types (e.g., state income tax or state property tax), although the federal income tax rates or country/township property tax rates are still positive. Nevertheless, the e¤ects of an income tax change on individuals at the state level depend on how much total tax is initially paid by the individuals in that state, either at the federal, state, or county level; this is exactly how individuals decide what to do in case of a change in any tax rate. Therefore, the results below should be interpreted as the implementation of a state-level tax change in states with either zero or non-zero initial state-level tax rate (for any type of tax). The data for such initial state-level tax rates are constructed and discussed in details in the Online Appendix. 6 
E¤ects of Wage-Income Taxes
What happens to the individual welfare and population of a state if that state increases its wageincome tax? In the short-run, the answer to this question is given in Table 1a , where we depict the elasticity of state tax revenue, individual utility (and its components) and population with respect to the state-level wage-income tax. As is evident, state tax revenue increases with wage-income tax for any state with an average elasticity of 0.88. According to the model, for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. After an increase in wage-income taxes, individuals supply more labor in order to compensate for lower after-tax wages. This results in higher employment in equilibrium with lower wages, because migration is not possible across states in the short-run. Since the increase in hours of work is higher than the reduction in wages, the state tax revenue increases.
When we make a comparison across states, Louisiana, Hawaii and Alabama would bene…t most in terms of their tax revenue out of a wage-income tax increase, while states of Iowa, South Dakota, New Hampshire and Texas would bene…t less. When we search for a systematic explanation for this result, the model implies that the following T axIndex is the main determinant of the di¤erence across regions:
which is a weighted average of initial taxes at the state level (for which the data are described in 13 particular, the relation between T axIndex and the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the wage-income tax is given in the upper left panel of Figure 1 in the short-run. As is evident, the states that have bene…ted more in relative terms are the ones with a lower T axIndex.
As is also evident in Table 1a , for any state, increasing the wage-income tax results in an individual welfare loss of around 0:18% (on average across states) after a 1% increase of wageincome tax in the short-run. When we investigate the reasons behind this average result at the individual level, it is due to the increase in hours of work, because the increase in public goods is not enough to cover the disutility due to working more. The heterogeneity across states, though, is again due to the T axIndex as depicted in the upper left panel of Figure 2 . Speci…cally, individuals in states with a higher T axIndex would su¤er more from an increase in wage-income tax in the short-run.
When we remove the restriction on migration in the long-run, individuals move across regions to equalize their welfare due to changes in taxes; on average (across states), about 0.28% of the state population moves to other states after a 1% increase in wage-income tax. In such a case, we obtain the long-run elasticities given in Table 1b , where the average (across states) elasticity of state tax revenue is about 0.60. This elasticity is lower than the short-run version of it, because some individuals would leave the states with higher wage-income taxes. According to the model, for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the long-run is very similar to the one in the short-run; the main di¤erence is that the population is lower in the long-run which results in lower tax revenue. When we search for a systematic explanation for the heterogeneity across states in the upper right panel of Figure 3 , we again observe that the states that have bene…ted more in relative terms are the ones with a lower T axIndex.
7 T axIndex for each state is given in Table A1 . The estimation results show that housing takes the highest share in individual utility with L = 0:64, followed by the disutility due to supplying labor with N = 0:14, consumption with C = 0:12, and public goods with P = 0:10. See the Online Appendix for further details.
E¤ects of Sales Taxes
The short-run e¤ects of an increase in sales taxes in a particular state are given in Table 2a where the average (across states) elasticity of tax revenue with respect to sales taxes is about 0.20. As is evident, the tax revenue of any state would increase after an increase in its sales tax rate. According to the model, for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. The increase in sales taxes increases the price of the consumption good for individuals who would like to work more for compensation. Since the corresponding increase in the wage income is higher than the increase in the tax-related cost of consumption, each individual ends up with paying higher sales taxes, which results in higher tax revenue for each state.
In the long-run, the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to sales taxes is lower for each state as depicted in Table 2b . Although the individual welfare is equalized in the long-run through migration, it is a¤ected negatively by an increase in sales taxes in the short-run. The average (across states) elasticity of welfare in such a case is about 0:10 as shown in Table 2a , which is, as expected, mostly due to the reduction in consumption and the increase in hours of work, where the increase in per capita public good is not enough for compensation. According to Figure 2 , once again, T axIndex is an important determinant of the heterogeneity across states, where individuals in states with a higher T axIndex would su¤er more from an increase in state-level sales taxes in the short-run.
E¤ects of Property Taxes
An increase in state-level property taxes would also increase tax revenue of any state, both in the short-run and long-run, as depicted in Tables 3a and 3b . According to the model, for each state, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. Especially in the short-run, since individuals cannot migrate across states, they would work more in order to compensate for higher taxes, which would result in lower wage rates and thus higher levels of production and higher income. Accordingly, although other tax rates remain the same, due to an increase in property taxes, the overall state tax revenue would increase. According to the lower left panels of Figures   1 and 3 , once again, the T axIndex seems to be the main determinant of tax revenue di¤erences across states.
One interesting result is related to the e¤ect of property tax on individual welfare in the shortrun. As is evident in Table 3a , in any state, individual welfare would increase after an increase in property taxes in the short-run. This is mostly due to higher per capita public good produced by lower wages, which even compensates for higher disutility due to supplies higher hours of labor. This result is consistent with studies such as by Seung and Kraybill (2001) Table 1a , which shows the e¤ects of an increase in the wage-income tax on individual welfare, the economic implications in Table 3a (showing the e¤ects of an increase in the property tax) are very similar:
higher hours of work, lower wages, and higher public goods. However, only in the case of increased property taxes, the increase in public goods is high enough to compensate for the disutility out of supplying labor. This result is mostly due to the individual optimality conditions where the share of housing L has a much higher estimated value compared to disutility coe¢ cient N due to supplying labor. 16 
E¤ects of Dividend-Income Taxes
Dividend-income tax is the only tax type that results in lower state tax revenue, in both short-run (with an average elasticity of 1:29) and long-run (with an average elasticity of 1:39), according
to Tables 4a and 4b . According to the model, the most e¤ective chain of logic in the short-run is as follows. Individuals would reduce both consumption and labor supply due to their utility optimization after the increase in dividend-income taxes. This would result in higher wages in any state which would a¤ect the overall production (and thus income) negatively. Accordingly, state tax revenue would decline in any state. Nevertheless, the reduction in tax revenue would be much lower for states with a lower T axIndex according to the lower right panel of Figures 1 and 3 .
The short-run e¤ects of an increase in dividend-income taxes would be negative on individual welfare of any state according to Table 4a . The main reasons behind this result are the reduction in per capita consumption and per capita public good; the reduction in hours of work is not enough to compensate for the reductions in consumption and public good.
Concluding Remarks and Discussion
Regional taxes are important public-policy tools that have implications on the distribution of tax revenue and individual welfare across regions. This paper has introduced a general equilibrium model with an analytical solution to investigate the implications of regional taxes that individuals pay by taking into account the interaction between regions through interregional trade. The model is rich enough to consider alternative tax types through a private sector, a public sector, and individual migration across regions. State-level evidence from the U.S. supports the model through regression analyses with high explanatory powers.
Based on the parameters estimated using the U.S. state-level data, the policy analysis suggests that any state in the U.S. would bene…t from an increase in wage-income tax, sales tax or property tax in terms of tax revenue, while any increase in dividend-income tax would result in a reduction employed with the necessary ingredients such as interregional trade in consumption goods, pro…ts through monopolistically-competitive …rms, or individual migration across regions. Although we have considered cases of both migration (in the long-run) and no migration (in the short-run)
for robustness, we kept other necessary ingredients in the model in order to answer the questions in hand. A richer modeling strategy would allow questioning the restrictions imposed by these ingredients, potentially while answering alternative questions. We leave such details for future research.
[18] Partridge, Mark D. and Dan S. Rickman, 1998. "Regional Computable General Equilibrium 
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Analytical Solution of the Model
We start with the labor market equilibrium, so that we can obtain an expression for wages. The per capita labor demand in region r is given by:
while, according to the individual optimality, the labor supply is implied as:
Hence, in equilibrium:
, wage rates are given by:
where we can solve for W r considering the implications of the model for We continue with the equilibrium of consumption goods. Accordingly, market clearing for goods produced in region r is given by:
which can be combined by P 
Substituting this into the labor-market equilibrium condition in Equation 5.1 implies that:
Using the public-good clearing condition i.e., T r = Y P r Wr A P r , together with the equilibrium condi-
Hr and individual optimization conditions given by:
the wage rate in region r is given by:
where
is what we call "T axIndex r " in the main text. The ratio of tax revenue across regions r and i is implied as follows:
3)
The ratio of wages across regions r and i is implied as follows:
where the ratio of population across regions r and i given by
is found by equalization of individual utilities across regions through migration.
The equalization of individual utilities across regions r and i implies that:
Since per capita housing is determined by the following market clearing condition:
and since per capita public good is given by:
and since individual optimality conditions imply:
the ratio of population across regions r and i is implied as:
Substituting this expression back into Equation 5.4 results in:
which can be used to …nd the closed-form solution for all other endogenous variables in the model.
Welfare Analysis
By keeping technology levels of A C r 's and A P r 's, parameters ( r , and r ) and the available housing of each region (given by Y L i 's) the same, we are interested in the e¤ects of a change in one particular region's tax rate on that region's individual welfare given by the exponential of the individual utility function. Accordingly, the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to region-speci…c tax rates in region r relative to region i is given by:
due to housing
due to labor supply 24 where c ( ) represents percentage change within the whole parenthesis after 1% of an increase in tax rates, and the components of this elasticity are given as follows:
where the relative percentage change in wages is given by:
the relative percentage change in population levels is given by:
the relative percentage change in tax revenues is given by:
Note that technology levels of A C r 's and A P r 's, parameters ( r and r ) and available housing in each region (given by Y L i 's) are e¤ectively cancelled out while calculating the log di¤erence between before and after tax changes. As is evident, when data for tax rates are available, the only 25 parameters that are necessary to calculate the elasticity of individual welfare with respect to region-speci…c tax rates are , C ; L ; P and N ; using data from the U.S., we estimate all of these parameters, below. Once such parameters are available, thanks to the general-equilibrium framework, for the counterfactual analysis, all one has to do is to include the changes in state-level tax rates into the equations introduced in this subsection.
We distinguish between the short-run and long-run e¤ects of tax rate changes, where short-run is de…ned as the case in which individual migration is not allowed across states (i.e., H r is constant for all r), while long-run is de…ned as the case in which individuals can migrate across states in order to equalize individual utility across states (i.e., H r is allowed to change for all r).
Testing Implications of the Model for the Elasticity of Substitution across Goods
The model implies that the total revenue of each private-sector producer is connected to the total cost according to the following expression: In particular, under the assumptions of CES utility functions and constant returns to scale, state level production data for total costs and total revenues in the U.S. are used to determine/estimate gross markups and thus the elasticity of substitution . The estimation results in = 3:6 with a standard error of 0.08 and an R-squared value of 0.97.
Testing Implications of the Model for State-Level Population
The log version of Equation 5.5 can be estimated as follows: As is evident by the tax rates in each state are given in Table A1, Table A2 , where all coe¢ cients are positive and signi…cant as expected with an R-squared value of 0.99. Combining these estimates with C + L + P + N = 1 results in the individual estimates for C ; L ; P and N in Table A2 . As is evident, housing takes the highest share in individual utility with L = 0:64, followed by the disutility due to supplying labor with N = 0:14, consumption with C = 0:12, and public goods with P = 0:10. These estimates are used in the welfare/counterfactual analyses.
Testing Implications of the Model for Tax Revenue
The log version of Equation 5.3 can be estimated as follows:
where the data are the same as above except for t A r which has been calculated according to Equation Table A2 for the parameters of C ; L and N .
using the results in
Since the coe¢ cient in front of the right hand side (i.e., population/tax interaction) is equal to 1 according to the model, we use restricted least squares which results in an R-squared value of 0.93 as shown in Table A3 . When we take an unrestricted approach where the coe¢ cients in front of the right hand side is allowed to be di¤erent from 1, the results are also given in Table A3, where the coe¢ cient is statistically very close to 1 (i.e., 0.97). Therefore, the implications of the model introduced in this paper are consistent with the available data on tax revenue, population and tax rates across U.S. states.
Testing Implications of the Model for Interstate Trade
Consider the individual optimality conditions for region k regarding the consumption goods imported from region i and region r:
where the notation is the same as in the main text. Accordingly, the ratio of imports of region k from region i versus region r is given by:
where we have used P C k;i = P C i;i k . Using the de…nition of factory-gate prices i.e., P
and marginal costs of production i.e., M C
, we can write:
which can be rewritten in log form using Equation 5.4 as follows:
Therefore, relative imports of a destination region from two source regions depends on the population ratio and the tax ratio of the source regions. We test this implication of the model using To make the connection between CFS and the model, we use the overall value of shipments. Data for taxes are the same as above, and the results in Table A2 are used for the parameters of C ; L and N .
Since the coe¢ cient in front of population and tax are both equal to 1 according to the model, we use restricted least squares which results in an R-squared value of 0.45 as shown in Table A4 .
When we take an unrestricted approach where the coe¢ cients in front of population and tax are allowed to be di¤erent from 1, the results are also given in Table A4 , where the coe¢ cient in front of taxes is statistically not di¤erent from 1, while the coe¢ cient in front of population is very close to 1 (i.e., 1.17). Therefore, in addition to the existing literature on gravity studies where variables such as population are standard, taxes enter the trade regressions positively and signi…cantly, which shows that the implications of the model introduced in this paper are consistent with the available data on trade and taxes across U.S. states.
Figure 1 -Short-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on State-Level Tax Revenue
Notes: The short-run is defined as the case where individuals are not allowed to migrate. The fitted curves and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals have been calculated using a quadratic regression between the elasticity of tax revenue and the TaxIndex given by = 0 + 1 + 2 ( ) 2 . TaxIndex has been normalized such that the state of California has a value of 1.
Figure 2 -Short-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on Individual Welfare
Notes: The short-run is defined as the case where individuals are not allowed to migrate. The fitted curves and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals have been calculated using a quadratic regression between the elasticity of individual welfare and the TaxIndex given by = 0 + 1 + 2 ( ) 2 . TaxIndex has been normalized such that the state of California has a value of 1.
Figure 3 -Long-run Effects of State-Level Taxes on State-Level Tax Revenue
Notes: The long-run is defined as the case where individuals are allowed to migrate. Notes: Values inside of the brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimation is by restricted least squares. The regression includes a constant that is not shown here. Notes: Values inside of the brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. Restricted regression is by restricted least squares, while unrestricted regression is by OLS. All regressions include a constant that is not shown here.
